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INTRODUCTION
It is a generally accepted view in economics and in the
practice of monetary policy that the best way for a central
bank to contribute to the long-term welfare of society is to
create a stable, predictable environment for market agents by
maintaining price stability and anchoring inflation
expectations. However, this does not mean that, in addition
to their price stability objective, central banks do not or
should not take into account real economy considerations to
some extent.
In establishing monetary policy objectives, it is of primary
importance to evaluate such objectives from a welfare
perspective. On the one hand, any monetary policy can be
maintained legitimately in keeping with the norms of
democracy if, by considering the structure of the economy as
a given, it leads to the maximum welfare of society for the
longest possible period of time. In order to provide a
normative definition for the optimal monetary policy as
described above, it is indispensable to ensure that the
decisions (regarding interest rates) made by the central bank
can be evaluated in respect of their impact on welfare. In
order to do so – within the framework of economic models –
we need to define an objective or loss function that is suitable
for evaluating the outcome of variables that are relevant for
welfare and for ranking, in keeping with the above, monetary
policies that weigh diverse considerations in different ways.
For a long time, economics was not able to provide a solid
welfare criterion which was in line with the decision-making
practices of central banks and which could serve as a basis for
classifying and prioritising various types of monetary policies.
The primary reason for this was that for a long time there was
no realistic analytical framework with a microeconomic basis
to model the impact of monetary policy on the real economy
and the explicit welfare costs of inflation. Consequently,
comparison between different monetary policies happened in
an ad-hoc manner and/or on the basis of loss functions with
arbitrarily chosen parameters. Naturally, an ad-hoc format is
also capable of describing a central bank’s system of goals,
but a loss function which can be analytically deducted from a
realistic model and which contains the so-called deep
parameters of the model constitutes an objective basis for
comparison, which helps formulate normative implications
for monetary policy.
WHAT DOES ECONOMIC THEORY SAY: 
A NORMATIVE APPROACH
In the past decade, the so-called New Keynesian or neo-
Wicksellian analytical framework has became widespread in
both academic research and the practices of central banks
(see Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003; Gali and Gertler,
2007). Compared to previously widespread models, the most
novel feature of the New Keynesian framework is that it
deducts conclusions from first principles,
1 with a
microeconomic basis and has an explicitly modelled
connection between monetary policy and the real economy.
Due to the microeconomic basis, the aforementioned
framework has proven suitable for evaluating the impact of
monetary policy on welfare and for approaching monetary
policy from a normative perspective (see Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1997). An additional feature of New Keynesian
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This study attempts to explain in an understandable manner that the central bank’s effort to keep inflation low is not an end
in itself, but ultimately serves the interests of social welfare. We attempt to substantiate this argument on the basis of economic
theory, based on the logic of New Keynesian models, by describing loss functions that contain welfare relevant variables and
interest rules that minimise them. By using this framework, we point out that – taking into account the limits of measurability,
learning and potentially non-rational expectations – decision-making rules that give considerable weight to a departure from
the inflation target and take into account real economy considerations generally perform well in terms of welfare and may be
considered robust in New Keynesian-type models with forward looking agents. Finally, we argue that through the strategy of
inflation targeting the normative implications of the above framework can be put into practice.
1 Such is, for example, the maximisation of utility by households and of profit by companies.models is that their basic versions can be described in a
transparent three equation system by using the first order
conditions arising from the optimisation problems of
households and firms and by adding a monetary policy rule.
In the following we would like to provide a simplified
description of the main features of the New Keynesian model
that can be reduced to three equations starting from the most
simple specification to the more complex and at the same
time more realistic ones. It is important to note that we do
not believe that the results generated by the New Keynesian
models can be directly and unconditionally translated into
central bank practice: their most important merit is that they
provide a logically consistent, normative framework for
thinking about monetary policy.
New Keynesian models differ from similar, general
equilibrium models (e.g. real business cycle models) in that
they presuppose market imperfections that impact nominal
variables. In this framework, corporations have market
power (which means that they are price-setters) and compete
in an oligopolistic way while there is friction in their pricing
decisions.
2 This friction (or rigidity) may arise, for example,
if obtaining information for a pricing decision or the very
process of pricing is costly for corporations. The simplest
New Keynesian model approaches this friction with the so-
called Calvo pricing (see Calvo, 1983).
3 Due to these
frictions, pricing is not instant and is not synchronised
between firms. Therefore, in any given time period non-zero
inflation leads to unintended changes in relative prices (in
other words, causes a real effect) because there will be firms
that are able to establish an optimal price, while others are
unable to change their prices to their optimal level. Due to
this friction, the actual output will fluctuate around the so-
called natural level (which would occur in the absence of
nominal rigidities).
In the absence of nominal rigidities, the steady state price set
by firms would equal the sum of their nominal marginal cost
and a desired price mark-up; however, due to the ‘stickiness’
of prices the actual and desired price mark-up will differ as a
result of various shocks. Firms that are unable to change the
price of their product at a given moment in time will have to
adapt to the change in profit margin, which occurs as a result
of a change in their relative prices, by way of their output.
Therefore, companies that are in the process of making their
pricing decisions will determine their current prices as a
function of the prices and marginal costs which they expect
in the coming periods, in other words, the expected profit
margin. The former is reflected in the real marginal cost
indicator which is the inverse of the above-mentioned profit
margin, that is, the ratio of the nominal marginal cost and the
price.
The so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, which is an
approximation of the steady state supply side of the model, is
a result of the above-described pricing behaviour of profit-
maximising companies. The New Keynesian Phillips curve is
forward-looking in which inflation at any given time depends
on the output gap and the inflation expected in the next
period.
(1)
Where πt is the inflation at time t, y
~
t is the output gap which,
in this framework, is the difference between the actual (yt)
and the ‘natural’ level (y
n
t) of output. Et is an operator that
indicates (rational) expectations which are based on
information that is available at time t, while  β and  κ are
coefficients which are derived from the structural or ‘deep’
parameters of the model. The output gap – in the case of
certain assumptions concerning preferences, technology and
labour market structure (see Clarida et al., 1999) – fluctuates
in proportion to the deviation of real marginal cost from its
steady state value. However, as a result of various nominal
(or real) frictions, the proportionality between the real
marginal cost and the output gap ceases to exist and a trade-
off emerges between the stabilisation of inflation and the
output gap (we will discuss the role of trade-offs below in
more detail).
Another important, demand-side consequence of assuming
not instantly adjusting (or ‘sticky’) prices is that monetary
policy is capable of having a short-term impact on the
forward-looking real interest rate by changing the nominal
interest rate, which thus affects the distribution of household
consumption over time periods. If time preference remains
the same,
4 an increase in the real interest rate compared to its
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2There may be several reasons for this: prices fixed in a long-term contract, costs related to re-pricing a product (menu cost), etc.
3 In the Calvo type pricing, firms can change their prices at any given time only as a function of an exogenous process and only with a certain degree of probability,
regardless of whether they changed their prices in the previous periods. As a result of this, the time periods during which the prices of various products remain fixed
overlap, that is, the changes in prices will not be synchronised. The Calvo type time-dependent pricing is of an ad-hoc nature; however, if used in standard models, it
yields results that are similar to those produced by the more realistic but mathematically more complex state-dependent pricing (see e.g. Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2005).
At the same time, however, Lombardo and Vestin (2007) point out that although that the two most popular time and state-dependent pricing types (Calvo- and
Rotemberg pricing) result in identical aggregate behaviour of firms (Phillips curve), they may have different welfare implications if the distortion that appears as a
result of the oligopolistic competition cannot be perfectly offset by the government.
4The utility function of households in a given time period contains consumption and leisure. The time preference measures the amount of future utility a household is
willing to sacrifice for the sake of current utility.natural level motivates households to reallocate their
consumption from the present to the future and the other
way round when real interest rates decrease. In keeping with
the above, the demand side of the standard New Keynesian
model – presupposing a closed economy and not taking into
account investments – can be described in the form of the IS
curve below which is derived from the behaviour of a utility
maximising household:
(2)
where it is the nominal interest rate which can be affected by
the central bank, it –E t {πt+1} is the forward-looking real
interest rate, and r
n
t the natural level of the real interest rate
(which prevails in an equilibrium without nominal rigidities).
The two equations described above also clearly show the
basic transmission channel of monetary policy: by changing
the interest rate the central bank diverts the real interest rate
from its natural level and, by way of its impact on aggregate
demand, opens the output gap which affects inflation
through the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Since both
inflation and the output gap are forward-looking variables, it
is clear that they are affected not only by the current interest
rate but by its future path as well.
As we have indicated before, in the New Keynesian
framework the welfare loss of households resulting from a
deviation from flexible price equilibrium
5 allocation can be
approached with a loss function
6 which is directly suitable for
examining the impact of monetary policy on welfare (see




t is the (hypothetical) utility of households in the
given period if prices were perfectly flexible and Ut
designates utility under the actual imperfections. Uc is the
marginal utility of consumption, C is the level of
consumption in a stable equilibrium, and the product of the
two yields a utility measure. The quadratic loss function
above results from a second order approximation to this
welfare loss which, in addition to its microeconomic
foundations, is also intuitive because it is similar in form to
objective functions that are widely used in the literature,
7 but
which contain parameters and variables in an ad-hoc way.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE NEW
KEYNESIAN MODEL
The New Keynesian models are closed with a monetary
policy block that determines the nominal interest rate. If we
describe monetary policy as a feedback rule that reacts to
endogenous variables, the inflation parameter must be
greater than one if we want stable equilibrium, that is, the
forward interest must also increase if inflation increases. For
monetary policy
8 to be optimal, the central bank must
determine the interest rate in a way that minimises social loss
on the basis of the welfare criterion defined above.
(4)
In the simplest New Keynesian model, monetary policy has
an easy task: it follows a rule of action that always closes the
output gap and therefore also brings the rate of inflation to
zero
9 by simultaneously minimising social loss; this is also
true the other way around. It is important to underline that
in the framework of the New Keynesian model monetary
policy reduces social loss not when it unconditionally
‘smoothes’ fluctuations in output, but rather when it attempts
to approximate it to its natural level which, in the case of
technology shocks, may be volatile. Therefore, the approach
of the New Keynesian model is fundamentally different from
the approach that defines the output gap as a difference
between actual and long-term trend-output.
Monetary policy also has an easy task when only demand
shocks (those that are related to the ‘IS equation’) can divert
the economy from a state of stable equilibrium. The demand
shocks that are assumed to be exogenous in the above
framework change the output gap and inflation in the same
direction, therefore the optimal reaction of monetary policy
– which minimises welfare loss – is trivial.
Because target variables are forward looking, that is, they also
depend on the values that they will take on in the future, at
any given time they will be determined not only by current
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5 In the standard New Keynesian model the Pareto-optimal or efficient (lacking any kind of distortions) and the natural output are the same. Although the latter contains
distortions (similar to dead weight losses) that arise from the presence of monopolistic competition; however, based on an implicit assumption, fiscal policy is capable
of providing a counterweight in the form of lump sum (non-distorting) taxes.
6 With a second order Taylor series approximation around the flexible price equilibrium allocation.
7The so-called loss functions are widespread in the literature and contain the sum of the deviation of inflation from its target value and the square of the output gap
in respect of a particular period. The popularity of the square loss function can be explained by the fact that it is a good representation of the symmetrical nature of
monetary policy: decision makers do not want high inflation, deflation, output below or in excess of its potential. On the other hand, a quadratic target function yields
a mathematically easily manageable system coupled with equations that describe the demand and supply in the economy in a linear (or log-linear) form (see, for
example, Benigno and Woodford, 2006).
8 It is important to note that normative conclusions depend on the assumption that expectations are rational and monetary policy is fully credible.
9 Blanchard and Gali (2005) calls this phenomenon ‘divine coincidence’.monetary policy but also by the expectations related to it.
The so-called ‘discretionary’ monetary policy does not
recognise that expectations can be influenced and re-
optimises in every period. At the same time, non-
discretionary monetary policy recognises that – if there is a
short-term trade-off between inflation and the output gap
(see below) – welfare loss can be reduced by using the
expectations channel. Monetary policy can influence
expectations if it is credibly committed to an optimal interest
rule in the long term (indefinitely). In order to be able to
benefit from such a commitment, the central bank must be
fully credible, that is, it must stick to its decisions made in the
past even if they did not have the optimal result in respect of
a given time period (‘history dependence’, see Woodford,
2003). Naturally, in real life central banks are unable to
commit themselves for an indefinite period of time; however,
the above serves as an important lesson in the practice of
monetary policy. Establishing credibility and managing
and/or anchoring expectations result in welfare gain, and
expectations for the future are important for effectively
achieving the stabilisation goals of monetary policy.
It is important to explain the difference between optimal and
simple interest rules. The optimal rules minimises the loss
function derived from the utility of the representative agent;
its coefficients result from the ‘deep’ parameters of the
model, and it assumes a knowledge of the natural level of
output and real interest rates. Because the latter are variables
that are not directly observable, therefore the optimal rules
that contain them are not necessarily suitable for direct use in
monetary policy practice. On the other hand, the so-called
simple rules are based on observable variables and are not
derived from the optimisation of a concrete model (an
example is the classic Taylor-rule
10). In an ideal case, simple
rules may have the advantage of ‘performing well’ in several
models with different specifications, in other words, they
result in a social welfare loss that is close to one that can be
achieved with a monetary policy that is considered optimal in
the given models.
In the above cases monetary policy could minimise the social
loss function without confronting a trade-off. Therefore, this
feature of the standard New Keynesian model implies a loss-
minimising monetary policy which immediately returns
inflation to zero in the case of exogenous shocks.
Maintaining zero inflation eliminates welfare loss arising
from the presence of nominal price rigidities; in the New
Keynesian framework this is the most that monetary policy
can do. Although central banks that follow inflation targeting
are often accused of leaving all factors, other than the
inflation process, out of consideration, the simplified
approach above is not characteristic of them either because
the short-term trade-off between output gap and inflation
stabilisation is an empirically well-established fact.
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN TARGETS
The trade-off between inflation and output gap can be
illustrated by making a small change to the standard models
described above. The simplest way to introduce the trade-off
is to supplement the New Keynesian curve above with an ad-
hoc ‘cost shock.’ As a result of the cost shock, the output gap
and inflation start moving in opposite directions, therefore
their simultaneous stabilisation is no longer possible. In such
cases, the task of monetary policy is to distribute the effect of
the shock in an optimal manner – in an attempt to minimise
social loss – between output gap and inflation.
(5)
Although the introduction of an ad-hoc cost shock (ut)
makes the implications of the New Keynesian model
regarding monetary policy more realistic, it is not in line
with the principle of building from microeconomic
foundations. However, the trade-off can also be introduced
from a ‘deeper’ foundation: the possibility of stabilising
inflation and output gap simultaneously depends primarily
on the frictions implied in the model. One example is when
there is a time-varying difference between ‘effective’
(completely frictionless) and natural (absent of nominal
frictions) level of output. A trade-off results also when
price rigidities are coupled with a rigid labour market
causing the real wage of the representative household
deviating from its ‘natural’ level. This is another factor
that, by distorting the real marginal costs of companies and
the choice of households between labour or leisure, results
in a non-optimal allocation and therefore leads to social
loss.
Erceg et al. (2000) introduces nominal wage rigidities into
the standard New Keynesian model analogously to Calvo
pricing: the nominal wage of households remains fixed to a
certain degree of probability in every time period, regardless
whether the wage changed in the previous period or not. As
a result of the frictions affecting prices and nominal wages,
wage inflation (changes in nominal wages, πw) is also
included in the social loss function; however, the
simultaneous stabilisation of inflation, wages and the output
{} t t t t t u y E + + = + κ π β π 1
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • NOVEMBER 2007 42
10The classic Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) is an estimated feedback rule which ties the level of the central bank’s prime rate to one constant (or the deferred prime rate) to




In this case, an optimal monetary policy reacts to price and
wage inflation as well as the output gap by giving more
weight to the ‘stickier’ nominal variable. In the previous
framework Erceg et al. (2000) examined the performance of
several simple interest rules in addition to that of the optimal
one. The results show that a welfare loss generated by the
optimal rule can also be achieved by a rule that reacts to price
and wage inflation, or price inflation and the output gap.
Besides labour market rigidities, the trade-off between
inflation and output gap may also emerge when the New
Keynesian model is extended to an open economy, and we
assume that there is friction concerning the pass-through of
exchange rate movements into prices. Gali and Monacelli
(2005), by placing both foreign and domestic goods in the
representative consumer basket and assuming that the pass-
through of exchange rate changes into consumer prices is
immediate and complete, concluded that social loss depends
on domestic consumer price inflation and on the output gap.
In this approach foreign monetary policy is assumed to be
optimal (which means that it reached the flexible price
equilibrium allocation) and the law of one price holds in the
case of imported consumer goods (which means that the
domestic and foreign prices of these products, if calculated in
the same currency, will be the same at all times) Based on the
above, this open economy model approach is analogous to
the standard New Keynesian model, that is, there is no trade-
off between the output gap and the stabilisation of domestic
inflation, therefore the optimal monetary policy can be
approximated with an interest rate rule that reacts to the
inflation of domestic consumer goods in addition to the
natural level of the real interest rate. Having a monetary
policy that reacts to the entire price index or fixes the
nominal exchange rate may result in greater welfare loss
because, due to the partial or full stabilisation of the
exchange rate, the relative price adjustments of foreign and
domestic consumer goods will occur, partially or fully,
through the nominally rigid domestic prices.
Monacelli (2005) proved in a similar open economy
framework that by relaxing the implausible assumption of
complete and immediate pass-through (see Campa and
Goldberg 2005) of exchange rate movements into prices
there will be a trade-off between the stabilisation goals of
monetary policy. Due to the incomplete pass-through in the
short term, the law of one price does not hold in the case of
foreign consumer goods, and exchange rate changes directly
affect the output gap and inflation. In this case monetary
policy could reach the flexible price equilibrium allocation if
it could simultaneously stabilise domestic inflation and the
deviation from the law of one price, which is infeasible in this
case. With respect to social welfare loss, a monetary policy
with commitment that reacts to the whole consumer price
index appears to be the least costly on the basis of a loss
function, used by Monacelli (2005), which contains the
output gap and total consumer price inflation. However, it is
important to note that the partial stabilisation of exchange
rate changes is implicit in this monetary policy.
THE LIMITS OF IMPLEMENTING OPTIMAL
MONETARY POLICIES
In this sub-section we describe the problems – which are
related to the basic assumptions of the theoretical framework
described above – that modify some of the normative
implications stemming from the simpler New Keynesian
models. One such problem may arise from model-uncertainty
and non-rational expectations of market participants.
Orphanides and Williams (2007) assume that the central
bank and economic agents, instead of rational expectations,
have imperfect information about economic structures,
especially concerning natural rates (output, unemployment,
real interest rate). Agents form their expectations on the basis
of a learning process, in the course of which they use a simple
forecast model which is continuously re-estimated as new
data come in. These circumstances considerably change loss
minimising monetary policy compared to models that
consider known economic structure and rely on rational
expectations. On the basis of the objective function used by
Orphanides and Williams (2007) – which is similar to those
described above, but is not deduced from the utility of the
representative household – a loss-minimising monetary
policy reacts stronger to inflation and to a lesser extent and
more gradually (by interest rate smoothing) to real economy
variables, which are estimated with uncertainty.
In connection with the above, it is important to note that the
real time estimates of the output gap may be rather inaccurate
due to various methodological problems and frequent data
revisions and may not even have the appropriate sign (see
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11 We have mentioned above that monetary policy is an economic policy tool that is suitable primarily for eliminating distortions that result from nominal rigidities. If
in the above-mentioned case only wage rigidities prevailed, monetary policy would be able to eliminate them similarly to the standard New Keynesian model.
However, the simultaneous prevalence of price and wage rigidities directly affects the accommodation of real wages and therefore results in a real economy
distortion that monetary policy is unable to counterbalance.model framework by Clarida and others (2000) that a
monetary policy, which gives considerable weight to real time
output gap estimates, may lead to strongly suboptimal
outcomes. The problem of taking real economy considerations
into account explicitly is apparent when a central bank’s loss
function or policy rule contains deviations from the estimated
long-term output trend (that is, from an atheoretic measure
generated by a simple time series method) as a variable that
measures real economy tensions. Although at first sight a
monetary policy that attempts to ‘smooth’ real economy
fluctuations appears to be justifiable from a welfare perspective,
output should fluctuate as an ‘effective’ response to
technological shocks that cannot be observed in real time. If in
this case monetary policy attempts to return output to its long-
term trend, it may generate inflation or deflation, contrary to
its original intention. On the basis of the above, an explicit
reaction to the output gap estimate that is available for decision
makers in real time poses a risk which is also reflected in the
practice of central banks: typically, they take into account real
economy considerations within the tolerance band surrounding
the inflation target, in the time-horizon of monetary policy
reaction, or by targeting a certain core inflation indicator (see
Palmquist, 2007). Targeting core inflation means that
monetary policy hardly, or not at all, takes into account
changes in price index components that are frequently affected
by cost/supply shocks (this is the monetary policy that is carried
on, for example, by the US Fed). The tolerance band around
the inflation target also allows for such impact.
The New Keynesian models described above also assume an
absolute credibility of monetary policy; however, this is not
always the case in real life. If market agents do not find the
central bank’s commitment to fighting inflation credible,
taking into account and emphasising real economy
considerations may be perceived as an inflation bias. In order
to avoid this, clear communication, transparency and
accountability by the central bank are of key importance.
WHAT DOES GOOD MONETARY POLICY
LOOK LIKE ON THE BASIS OF THE LOGIC
OF NEW KEYNESIAN MODELS?
On the basis of the logic of the New Keynesian model
framework described above, we can formulate the following
normative implications in respect of monetary policy:
• Monetary policy must take into account that theoretically,
all it can do is to eliminate the impact on welfare of
distortions that result from nominal rigidities; in other
words, it cannot attempt to reach an output that is
permanently higher than the natural level.
• It has a decision-making rule that focuses on stabilising
those price and/or wage inflation indices that exhibit
nominal rigidities. The weight(s) given to stabilising
individual price and/or wage indexes is in proportion to the
extent of their stickiness. It is especially important for the
central bank’s interest rate to change in the same direction
as the inflation but to a greater extent, that is, for example,
in the case of a demand shock that increases inflation, the
real interest rate must increase as well.
• A deviation from the natural level of output is included in
the loss function of the representative market player, and
monetary policy also attempts to minimise it. If the
economy suffers a shock that changes inflation and the
output gap in opposite directions, an optimal monetary
policy would distribute its effect between the two variables.
Furthermore, when taking into account real economy
considerations, it is important to ensure that the price
stability goals of the central bank’s monetary policy is
credible.
• It is aware that expectations of future changes in monetary
policy, when market players are forward looking, are just
as important in respect of welfare-relevant variables as
current interest rate changes. A loss-minimising monetary
policy benefits from the welfare gains stemming from the
management of expectations and creates a high degree of
credibility in order to do so. Credibility depends primarily
on whether previously declared goals and commitments
have been met.
• If there is considerable uncertainty about the models that
describe the economy or if assumptions about being
perfectly informed and about expectations being rational
are not realised, a loss-minimising monetary policy will
react to a considerably greater degree to inflation and to a
lesser extent to variables which reflect the slack in the real
economy but cannot be directly observed. Furthermore,
under the conditions described above a lower welfare loss
may result if monetary policy changes the interest rate only
gradually (smoothing over the interest rate) in response to
new information.
CONCLUSIONS: IS INFLATION
TARGETING A GOOD MONETARY
POLICY?
We argue that inflation targeting provides a strategic
framework within which the implications formulated above
can be put into practice. Central banks that conduct the ‘best
practice’ of inflation targeting (hereinafter IT central
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • NOVEMBER 2007 44
12 Such is the British, Canadian, Norwegian, Swedish and New Zealand central bank.banks)
12 typically do not have a well-defined real economy
target in addition to their explicit numerical inflation target.
This, however, does not mean that they do not take into
account real economy considerations. This may not be
evident, but by attempting to reach their price stability goals
for a horizon of 1-2 years, IT central banks implicitly declare
that they are unwilling to take any magnitude of real
economy cost in order to stabilise inflation in the short term
when shocks that move inflation and the output gap in
opposite directions occur. However, making decisions 1-2
years ahead requires the central bank to prepare forecasts
and formulate its monetary policy accordingly. This practice
(‘inflation forecast targeting’ – see Svensson 1997) also
allows real economy considerations to be taken into account
even though the central bank only reacts if the inflation
forecast deviates from the target. This is because the
inflation forecast by definition includes the impact of all
variables that may have a significant impact on inflation in
the future. They typically include the current values of
variables that may be considered relevant in respect of
welfare on the basis of the models that are described above
(e.g. wage and output gap estimates). As Svensson (2007)
points out, most modern central banks follow ‘flexible’
inflation targeting (which means that they also take into
account real economy considerations). ‘Strict’ IT (which is
only construction with inflation), on the other hand, can be
considered more of a theoretical construction with the
possible exception of periods when monetary policy has
credibility problems.
IT central banks also fit into the described theoretical
framework because they typically use a short-term interest
rate as an instrument, and, furthermore, their behaviour ex
post can be well approximated with an estimated Taylor rule
that gives considerable (greater than unity) weight to
deviation form the inflation target.
13 This, however, does not
mean that in practice monetary policy follows a pre-defined
interest rate rule that is effective at any point in time. There
is a commitment that is in line with the theoretical
implications; however, it is not a commitment to an interest
rule but to a medium-term target criterion that constitutes the
inflation target (see Svensson and Woodford, 2003). This
practice – if it appears to be credible for economic agents –
creates inflation expectations that correspond to price
stability and – as we have mentioned above – provides
adequate flexibility in the short run in adapting to supply or
cost shocks.
In order to use short-term flexibility effectively and/or to
create credibility that is necessary for anchoring medium-
term expectations, IT central banks focus on transparency
and the accountability of decision makers. Furthermore,
commitment, transparency and the accountability of
decision-makers also ensure that monetary policy does not
systematically attempt to reach an output that is higher than
the natural level.
Consequently, the current practice of inflation targeting
places considerable weight on reaching price stability while
also taking into account real economy considerations, mostly
by avoiding potential risks arising from explicit reactions to
variables that are hard to observe or measure in real time.
Furthermore, inflation targeting takes advantage of managing
expectations in the form of a commitment to a medium-term
target criterion. Based on the above, we can claim that the
strategy of inflation targeting satisfies the most important
normative implications that can be derived from the
theoretical framework introduced above.
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